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Lies, Damn Lies, and Batson Challenges:
The Right to Use Statistical Evidence to
Prove Racial Bias
Graham R. Cronogue *
This Article provides two principal contributions to the study of
wrongful convictions. First, it fills a gap in the literature by
clarifying the scope of a capital defendant’s constitutional right
to use statistics when attacking a wrongful conviction caused by
racial bias in jury selection. In doing so, the Article not only
examines the content of the Court’s jurisprudence but it also
explores the historical “arc” toward greater evidentiary
protections. This arc has been guided primarily by the
realization that prior narrower solutions have been ineffective at
combating racially-motivated peremptory strikes. The Article
will also place modern statistical evidence in its proper place on
that arc by discussing the relevance and unique value of
statistics in illuminating patterns and bias. 1 Second, it examines
the comparative merits of conferring these wrongful conviction
protections through statute or confirming them through
constitutional litigation. In light of the severe backlash against
North Carolina’s statute, this Article advocates the, perhaps
more lasting and less politically dependent, approach of
constitutional litigation.
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Especially in the peremptory strike context where bias is otherwise very difficult to
prove.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the many significant advances in the field of equal
protection, the American criminal justice system remains haunted by its
legacy of racial discrimination. Formal and overt tactics of racial
discrimination have been effectively stamped out. 2 However, less overt
tactics still slip by undetected, and the specter of slavery and Jim Crow
continues to cast a shadow over the legitimacy of the legal process.3 As a
result of these hidden tactics, minority defendants still face the danger
that they will be wrongfully convicted because of their race; 4 courts still
run the risk that the sentences they impose will be tainted by racial bias;5

2

See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding that
segregation of
children in public schools is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
3
Discrimination within the judicial system is most pernicious because it is “a
stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to [black citizens]
that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.” Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1986). See also
SAMUEL GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
CAPITAL SENTENCING xiii (1989) (“The Supreme Court has more or less acknowledged
that race continues to play a major role in capital sentencing in America . . . But the Court
has decided to do nothing about [discrepancies in the imposition of capital punishment]
and refuses to hear future claims based on it.”).
4
See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson et. al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit
Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513,
563–65 (2014) (finding evidence of implicit racial bias in a juror’s perception of a
criminal defendant’s capital case).
5
See e.g., Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in
Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of
Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2010) (discussing the
role that a trial judge’s implicit bias may play in jury selection).
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and our society must still struggle with the fact that the promise of equal
protection remains an aspiration and not a reality for so many Americans.
This Article addresses one of the most subtle, yet effective, forms of
discrimination that continues to burden the criminal justice system:
racially biased peremptory strikes. In recent years, these strikes have
garnered considerable attention from courts, state legislatures, and the
media; however, they remain a significant obstacle to the fair, impartial
administration of justice. 6
By their very nature, peremptory strikes are difficult to police. A
peremptory strike may be used for any reason against a juror as long as
the attorney demonstrates a plausible, non-discriminatory reason for
striking the juror from the pool.7 Therefore, while a prosecutor may have
removed a juror because he is black, he can avoid detection by putting
forward a different reason for the strike. 8 In a legal environment where
such vague explanations as a juror’s “casual” demeanor 9 are plausible,
non-racial reasons, it is very difficult for the defendant to prove that race
was the actual reason for any specific strike.10 Since peremptory strikes
remain a uniquely attractive option for a lawyer hoping to exclude
minority jurors, 11 it is perhaps not surprising that race continues to play a
non-trivial role in jury selection in many states and prosecutorial
districts. 12

6

Edward Pilkington, Missouri Pressured to Halt Execution of Black Man Sentenced
By All-White Jury, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2015, 3:07 P.M.),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/13/missouri-governor-pressuredexecution-andre-cole-white-jury.
7
In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), the Supreme Court held that
the Equal Protection Clause also prohibits the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges based solely on gender; however, this Article will focus exclusively on the
racial component of peremptory strikes.
8
Id.
9
For examples of vague reasons accepted by the courts as valid bases for peremptory
strikes, see, e.g., People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (Ind. 1989) (casual manner);
United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010–11 (5th Cir. 1987) (“posture and
demeanor”); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.1987) (“poor
attitude”); United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070–71 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“avoidance of eye contact”).
10
Such a task is even more difficult on appeal as the panel would not have had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the juror in question.
11
Barbara O’Brien and Catherine M. Gosso, Report on Jury Selection Study,
MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. COLLEGE OF LAW (Dec. 15, 2011), http://digitalcommons.law.
msu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1330&context=facpubs at 11(finding a “statistically
significant disparity” between prospective black jurors and prospective white jurors in
North Carolina).
12
Id.
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Though subtle, the damage caused by a racially biased peremptory
strike should not be understated. 13 It deprives a defendant of the most
basic protection in our criminal justice system—the right to an impartial
jury that has been indifferently chosen with respect to race. At the same
time, it puts a prosecutor in a disproportionately powerful position to
control the racial makeup of a jury, allowing him to play on racial biases
and a lack of cross-racial understanding. As empirical studies have
shown, juries from which minorities have been intentionally excluded are
significantly more likely to convict African Americans. 14 This problem is
especially disconcerting in the capital punishment context, where a
wrongful conviction carries with it extreme and irreparable harm. 15 Such
results profoundly undermine the legitimacy of our courts and the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In an attempt to remedy this problem, some southern states have
taken—or considered taking—action by conferring upon each capital
defendant a statutory right to use statistical evidence of racial bias.16 The
underlying goals of these attempts—fair and just trials, the minimization
of false convictions, and greater equality in sentencing and punishment—
cannot be legitimately challenged. 17 However, the method by which
these rights are secured—statistical evidence from a large group of
cases—has been vehemently opposed.
North Carolina’s initial triumph and eventual failure in this matter is
especially instructive. In 2012, the North Carolina legislature attempted

13
Id.; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991)(“[R]acial discrimination in
the qualification or selection of jurors on account of race, ethnicity, or gender ‘offends
the dignity of persons and the integrity of the courts.”).
14
See generally Levinson, supra note 4 (finding evidence of implicit racial bias in a
juror’s perception criminal defendant’s case); see also Patrick Bayer, et al., The Impact of
Jury Race in Criminal Trials, DUKE POP. RESEARCH INST. (June 2011) (analyzing the
effect of different racial compositions of jury on criminal verdict).
15
Clearly, a racially biased peremptory strike also deprives a prospective juror of his
right to serve on a jury on account of his race or ethnicity, a separate (but still severe)
constitutional violation. See e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
16
For more information about North Carolina’s Racial Justice Act, see Kim Severson,
North Carolina Repeals Law Allowing Racial Bias Claim in Death Penalty Challenges,
N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/us/racial-justice-actrepealed-in-north-carolina.html?_r=0. For a discussion of efforts in Texas, see Scott
Goldstein, Dallas DA Craig Watkins to Push for Law Allowing Appeals Based on Racial
Factors, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 22, 2013), http:// www.dallasnews.com/news/
community-news/dallas/headlines/20130121-dallas-da-craig-watkins-to-push-for-lawallowing-appeals-based-on-racial-factors.ece.
17
The Supreme Court has consistently held that procedural safeguards should prevent
the arbitrary enforcement of the death penalty. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 240
(1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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to right some of its past wrongs 18 by implementing the “Racial Justice
Act,” which afforded a defendant the right to use statistical evidence to
show racially biased peremptory strikes in his state, county, or district. 19
Instead of being embraced as a creative solution to a seemingly
insurmountable problem, the RJA ignited a firestorm of controversy. 20
According to the opponents of the RJA, the statute’s approval of
statistical evidence from similar cases is improper. That is, a defendant
should only be able to use evidence of jury selection tactics that he can
directly prove occurred during his trial; he should not be able to use
statistical evidence of strikes from other cases to prove bias in his case. 21
The debates surrounding the wisdom of this statutory provision seem
to suggest that a defendant’s right to use statistics from other cases to
demonstrate racial bias derives only from statute; he has no constitutional
right to use such evidence. 22 The subsequent repeal, which specifically
attacked the statistical evidence provision, confirms that the legislature
18

See, e.g., Michal Biesecker, Racial Justice Act Repeal Hits a Roadblock, NEWS &
OBSERVER (June 6, 2011), http://www.pfadp.org/pfadp-news-othermenu-71/492-racialjustice-act-repeal-hits-a-roadblock (quoting Rep. Paul Luebke “[u]ntil 1965, racial
discrimination was legal in this state. Racial discrimination is part of our history, part of
our heritage. It is wrong to pretend that racial discrimination does not still exists in this
state.”); THE TRIALS OF DARRYL HUNT, (BREAK THRU FILMS 2006) (available on HBO)
(Darryl Hunt, a black man in North Carolina, was wrongfully sentenced to life in prison
based on an eyewitness identification from a former Klu Klux Klan member. The
conviction was believed to be racially motivated); William J. Barber II, Voices: Ending
Racial Injustice and Prosecutorial Misconduct, THE INSTITUTE FOR SOUTHERN STUDIES
(July 2007), http://www.southernstudies.org/2009/07/post-44.html; ACLU, Innocent
North Carolina Man Exonerated After 14 Years On Death Row (May 2, 2008) (Levon
“Bo” Jones, an African–American who was wrongfully convicted and spent 13 years on
death row because of false testimony).
19
Barbara O’Brien & Catherine M. Grosso, Confronting Race: How A Confluence of
Social Movements Convinced North Carolina to Go Where the McCleskey Court
Wouldn’t, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463, 464 (2011) (“North Carolina stands alone in
providing capital defendants a strong claim for relief based on statistical evidence . . . .”)
(citations omitted).
20
Matt Smith, ‘Racial Justice Act’ Repealed in North Carolina, CNN (June 21, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/20/justice/north-carolina-death-penalty/; Josh Ellis and
David Horn, GOP Lawmakers Plan to Address Racial Justice Act, NORTH CAROLINA
NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 17 2011), http://www.ncnn.com/edit-news/6454-gop-lawmakerplan-to-address-racial-justice-act; Gary Robertson, N.C. House Panel Backs Repealing
Racial Justice Act, NEWS & OBSERVER (June 6, 2011), http://www.victoriaadvocate.com
/news/2011/jun/01/bc-nc-xgr-death-penalty1st-ld-writethru/.
21
See also WRAL News, DAs Seek Repeal of Death Penalty Law (Nov. 15, 2011),
http://www.wral.com/news/state/nccapitol/story/10383586/ (quoting District Attorney
Scott Thomas, “[i]n its current form, generalized statewide statistics can be used to vacate
every death sentence in North Carolina. We believe that death penalty decisions should
be based upon the facts and the law of a particular case not on generalized unreliable
statewide statistics.”).
22
See id.
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believed the right to use statistical evidence in this context is a statutory
right only. 23 This focus on the statutory right is misplaced. The use of
statistical evidence to prove racial bias falls squarely inside a defendant’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free of, and prove, racial
discrimination, as well as the Sixth Amendment right to a properly
constituted jury.
In light of the aims of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause
should naturally be interpreted to give defendants robust power to rely on
“all relevant circumstances” and evidence, including statistics from other
cases, to prove purposeful discrimination.24 The primary purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment is to end all forms of governmental
discrimination on account of race,” 25 including the exclusion of potential
jury members on account of race. 26 Unquestionably, a defendant must
have the right to prove discrimination before he may secure these
constitutional protections.27 Therefore, while a state may be able to
combat discrimination by conferring a statutory right on defendants to
use statistical evidence in post-conviction proceedings, such a tactic
would only clarify, not create, a defendant’s right to prove
discrimination. 28

23

See Sen. Doug Berger, Senate Floor Debate on Racial Justice Act (May 14, 2009)
(“[I]f states wanted to provide this additional protection and [allow statistics to] prove
racial discrimination, then they could do it.”). Similarly, the notion that this evidentiary
right flows only from statute, and not a defendant’s constitutional protections, has spurred
advocacy groups to suggest and some states to consider passing additional racial justice
acts to better arm potential victims of racial bias. This Article certainly does not criticize
those working to produce racial justice acts in other states. These statutes are immensely
valuable in providing needed clarity to the right and clearing the road in what could prove
to be a more efficient manner than complex litigation campaigns. These statutes also can
create a new cause of action for those whose appeals have been exhausted. Most
importantly, as the North Carolina RJA has shown, they can spur new studies and
discussion on issues of racial bias.
24
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 96–97 (1986).
25
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 306–07 (1880); see also Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305 (this 132-year-old case has been continuously reaffirmed).
In fact, the Court has explicitly held that “[p]urposeful racial discrimination in selection
of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection because it denies him the
protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
27
See e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“it is a general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or
action at law.”).
28
They may also be used to expand the right or to give a in conferring an additional
“bite at the apple” in habeas cases, as the North Carolina RJA did.
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Statistical evidence is a crucial tool for proving racial bias and
effectuating constitutional rights. Properly-conducted studies can
illuminate patterns and motivations for conduct that we cannot otherwise
see, especially if we expand the inquiry to a large number of cases.29 In
recognition of this fact, the Supreme Court has endorsed the use of
statistics in proving patterns of discrimination in several other cases. 30
Yet, despite the Court’s endorsement of statistical evidence and its
encouragement to look outside the four corners of a case, there is
confusion as to whether a defendant can do both of these things—i.e.
whether a defendant can use statistical evidence derived from events that
occurred outside the four corners of the case.
This Article provides some much needed guidance on this issue by
examining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding a defendant’s
evidentiary rights when attempting to prove racial bias in the use of
peremptory strikes. This Article will discuss the misguided interpretation
of Supreme Court precedent put forward by some scholars. It will show
that the Supreme Court did not impose the often-insurmountable burden
of providing proof of discriminatory intent in each specific case.31 Next,
the Article will examine the admissibility of statistical evidence in the
peremptory strike context under accepted evidentiary standards,
primarily the Federal Rules of Evidence. It will also compare the types of
statistical evidence commonly accepted by courts in other contexts to
show that statistical evidence provisions actually codify what the
Fourteenth Amendment already demands: robust evidentiary rights to
combat racial decimation. Finally, the Article will consider the two major
methods for allowing defendants to introduce statistical evidence into
wrongful conviction challenges: passage of a racial justice act or
litigation designed to clarify the evidentiary right.
29

RICHARD HARRIS, A PRIMER OF MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2001) (discussing the
“inferential” applications and benefits of statistics and their ability to explain why things
occur); see also RICHARD RUNYON, DESCRIPTIVE AND INFERENTIAL STATISTICS: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (1977).
30
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(invalidating a zoning ordinance on Equal Protection grounds); see also Bazemore v.
Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (finding it acceptable to consider regression analysis
demonstrating racial discrimination in salaries). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 280 (1987) (“This Court has accepted statistics as proof of intent to discriminate in
the context of a State’s selection of the jury venire and in the context of statutory
violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”).
31
Namely, the Court’s decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 280 (1987),
which has been seen as one of the worst Supreme Court decisions since Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Loss of Constitutional
Faith: McClesky v. Kemp and the Dark Side of Procedure, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 5, 5
(2012).
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THE PROBLEM: PEREMPTORY STRIKES

The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to
distort the jury process by permitting the exclusion of
jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to
ban them entirely from the criminal justice system.
–Justice Thurgood Marshall 32
Both for cause 33 and peremptory 34 challenges can be used to exclude
venire members from the jury. For cause challenges allow parties to
remove venire members on the “narrowly specified, provable and legally
cognizable basis of partiality.” 35 Thus, for cause challenges exclude only
those venire members who have demonstrated a readily observable bias
and whose service on the jury could raise significant questions of
partiality. 36 In contrast, a peremptory challenge affords parties in a
criminal or civil trial the right to excuse a set number of jury members
absent a showing of any partiality. 37 In other words, by using a
peremptory challenge, a party can bar a venire member despite the
judge’s determination that the he or she could render a fair, impartial
verdict. 38 Naturally, it is through the peremptory challenge that an
attorney could most easily distort the racial composition of the jury.
This practice of striking a juror for no particular reason is deeply
rooted in English and American legal tradition. In fact, peremptory
strikes date back to English common law 39 and were already “venerable”
in Blackstone’s time. 40 As Blackstone observed in 1305, the “the law
wills not that [a defendant] should be tried by any one man against whom
[the defendant] has conceived a prejudice, even without being able to
assign a reason for dislike.” 41
32

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106–07 (1986) (Marshall, J. concurring in
judgment).
33
28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012).
34
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
35
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (overruled on other grounds by
Batson, 476 U.S. at 79).
36
See Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
37
Id. (a peremptory challenge is “exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry
and without being subject to the court’s control”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012)
(allowing peremptory strikes in civil cases).
38
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 (b).
39
JAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 302 (1883)
(defendants in felony cases were given the right to challenge up to 35 jurors).
40
United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000) (citing 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 346-348 (1769)).
41
BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at 353.
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The American legal system was quick to adopt this tactic, ironically
seeing it as an important part of “reinforcing a defendant’s right to trial
by an impartial jury.” 42 In 1789, the Select Committee of the House of
Representatives suggested that the Sixth Amendment contain a provision
protecting the “right of challenge and other accustomed requisites,”
including peremptory challenges. 43 However, Congress rejected this
proposed language on the grounds that this provision was not necessary:
In Congress’s view, the right to a peremptory strike was already
embodied in the term “impartial jury.” 44 Since 1790, the exercise of
peremptory strikes by defendants and prosecutors has been consistently
upheld. 45 Its use has been guided—albeit with mixed results—by the
courts 46 and by state statutes. 47 Yet, despite Congress’s apparent faith in
peremptory strikes as important tools for ensuring an impartial jury, 48
these unquestioned strikes have been widely used as a vehicle for
discrimination based on race and gender.49
Biased strikes violate the Equal Protection Clause and the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee to an impartial jury in three principal ways. 50
First, racially motivated strikes violate the purported guarantee that “the
42
Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 311; see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 212–213; Pointer v.
United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1984).
43
Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 369, 374 (1992) (citing James Madison, Amendments to the New
Constitution, GAZETTE OF THE U.S., Jun. 13, 1789, at 70).
44
S. Mac Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional
Right, 39 BROOK. L. REV. 290, 297–99 (1973); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Still, in
1790, Congress clarified this right by giving defendants a statutory right to twenty
peremptory challenges in capital cases. See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes
Against the United States, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 119 (1790); see also Broderick, supra note
44, at 374 (explaining the history of the peremptory strike in American law).
45
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n.22 (1986) (use of peremptory strikes “has
long served the selection of an impartial jury”); id. at 112 (characterizing peremptory
challenge as “procedure which has been part of the common law for many centuries and
part of our jury system for nearly 200 years”) (Burger, J., dissenting); see also Swain, 380
U.S. at 219 (“[t]he function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality
on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will
decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise”).
46
See generally Batson, 476 U.S. at 79 (imposing constitutional limitations on the use
of peremptory strikes); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
47
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 (allowing peremptory strikes in criminal cases); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1870 (2012) (allowing peremptory strikes in civil cases).
48
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012).
49
See United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 1975) (in 1974, the
prosecutors in the Western District of Missouri struck 81% of black jurors peremptorily);
State v. Washington, 375 So.2d 1162, 1164 (La. 1979) (a prosecutor admitted that he
routinely struck black jurors).
50
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (holding in part the Equal Protection clause forbid the
prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of race).
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State will not exclude members of [the defendant’s] race from the jury
venire on account of race.” 51 Second, they deprive the defendant of an
impartial jury of his peers that has been “indifferently chose[n]” with
respect to race. 52 Finally, they violate the rights of individual jurors not
to be excluded from jury service on the basis of race.53
While antithetical to the notion of equal justice, jury exclusion has
been a fixture of our justice system. Before the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, blacks were systematically and openly excluded from the
courtroom and the jury box. 54 These discriminatory actions were not only
widely practiced and tolerated but were expressly and consistently
condoned by the nation’s highest court.55 In fact, it was not until after the
Reconstruction period that the Court’s jurisprudence on race-based jury
discrimination began to, very slowly, breathe life into the promise of an
impartial jury for all Americans. 56 The Court began its attempt feebly,
addressing only overt discrimination in the case at hand and turning a
blind eye to all improper strikes in past cases. 57 This myopic focus on
specific and discrete acts proved debilitating as in most cases it is
exceedingly difficult to prove that the any specific strike was actually
motivated by race and not some pretextual reason, such as “demeanor” or
“style of dress.” 58 As the Court came to realize that its proposed
solutions were ineffective, it began to expand the evidentiary net and

51

Id. at 86 (citations omitted).
Id. at 87 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
53
Id.(stating that “[a] person’s race simply ‘is unrelated to his fitness as a juror’”)
(quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
54
See e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 400 (1856) (“the plaintiff was not a
citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged in his declaration, being a negro of African
descent, whose ancestors were of pure African blood, and who were brought into this
country and sold as slaves”). In fact, many “Black Codes,” including those in North
Carolina, went so far as to explicitly deny blacks the essential right to serve on juries.
James B. Browning, The North Carolina Black Code, 15 J. NEGRO HIST. 461, 461–73
(1930). Joseph A. Ranney, A Fool’s Errand? Legal Legacies of Reconstruction in Two
Southern States, 9 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 16 (2002).
55
Id. Is there a direct citation that corresponds to this sentence? See e.g., Dred Scott,
60 U.S. at 400.
56
For a discussion of each stage of this process, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2004).
57
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879).
58
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986). While Batson challenges do pose a
non-trivial requirement on prosecutors to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the
peremptory challenge, Batson is certainly not a complete solution of the problem. For the
reasons discussed later in this paper, Batson challenges are often easily defeated and
would only be able to weed out a very small number of cases.
52
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consider other evidence of racial bias, including “patterns” of actions
occurring “outside the four corners” of the case at hand. 59
Given the state of modern statistical analysis and its ability to find
patterns from a large set of actions,60 this Article argues that statistical
evidence clearly falls in line with the kinds of proof that the Court has
recognized in its jurisprudence.61 As the following analysis demonstrates,
the Court’s slow march toward a more and more inclusive stance on
evidence of racial bias has been continually spurred by the realization
that other more restrictive approaches fail to give full force to the
protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 62

A.
Push Toward Greater Fourteenth Amendment Protections:
Evidentiary Rights Under Strauder and Swain
The Court’s 1880 decision in Strauder v. West Virginia marked the
first major step toward securing the right of an impartial jury for all
Americans. In Strauder, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider
the constitutionality of a West Virginia statute that explicitly stated that
only white people could serve on juries. 63 In finding that such a practice
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment “not only gave citizenship and the privileges of citizenship
to persons of color, but it denied any State the power to withhold from
them the equal protection of the laws,” and that included among these
protections is the right to an impartial jury. 64 West Virginia violated this
defendant’s equal protection rights when it tried him in front of a jury
from which members of his own race had been purposefully excluded.65

59

Miller-El v. Dretke at 239–240 .
See HARRIS, supra note 29 (discussing the “inferential” applications and benefits of
statistics and their ability to explain why things occur); see also RUNYON, supra note 29.
61
For a discussion of patterns and statistics used in the employment discrimination
context, see Tex. Dept. of Community Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); see
also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
62
Recent studies on racial bias in jury selection should act as the next impetus,
compelling even more robust protection. For a discussion of the new studies and
methods, see infra page 28.
63
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306.
64
Id. at 306–08 (1879) (“The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that
is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as
that which he holds.”).
65
Id. (“[I]n the selection of jurors to pass upon [a defendant’s] life, liberty, or property,
there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against them, because of
their color.”); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1881); see also Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 313, 323 (1880).
60
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Strauder represented a major step in stamping out discrimination and
set the “foundation for the Court’s unceasing effort to eradicate racial
discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire.”66 However,
its focus on laws that on their face barred individuals from serving on a
jury because of their race proved too narrow. Strauder did nothing to
stop actions that were facially race-neutral but had the same deleterious
effect the Strauder Court sought to stamp out, i.e. “lessen[ed] the
security of [African Americans’] enjoyment of the rights which others
enjoy.” 67
In the wake of Strauder, Southern states continued to discriminate
against black jurors. 68 Rather than drafting overtly discriminatory laws,
state legislatures and prosecutors began passing laws and engaging in
practices that were facially race-neutral 69 but still had the effect of
excluding African Americans from the jury box. 70 For instance, many of
these laws imposed requirements—usually financial—for service that
most newly freed blacks could not meet. Other laws created very
subjective requirements—such as high moral character or sufficient
intelligence—that a prosecutor could easily manipulate to exclude
whomever he wished. 71 Given the excessively high burden of showing
required under Strauder, black defendants could not effectively
challenge these laws. 72 Thus, African American venire members still
faced significant statutory obstacles to jury service well after Strauder. 73
Indeed, prosecutors began using peremptory strikes and other
exclusionary tactics against minorities at an alarming rate, effectively
achieving the same outcome as the West Virginia statute.74
The Court’s modest advancement against these tactics came in Swain
v. Alabama. Swain reaffirmed that a “State’s purposeful or deliberate
denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the
66

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
68
For a discussion of various statutory obstacles to jury participation including the
financial requirement of paying taxes and obviously subject requirements of “good moral
character” and “sufficient intelligence,” see Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The
Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North
Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2050 (2010).
69
For a discussion of various statutory obstacles to jury participation including the
financial requirement of paying taxes and obviously subject requirements of “good moral
character” and “sufficient intelligence,” see Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The
Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North
Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2050 (2010).
70
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
71
Id. My editor could not find this proposition in Strauder. Please review.
72
See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
73
See Kotch & Mosteller, supra note 68, at 2050.
74
Id.
67
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administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause.”75
However, it went a step further, recognizing that racial discrimination
can occur even in the exercise of a race-neutral law or practice.76 The
Court held that a defendant can show racial discrimination if he can
demonstrate that the prosecutor engaged in a “systemic pattern” of
strikes against African Americans. 77
Despite its lofty goal, this ruling did little to actually promote equal
protection in many cases. To satisfy the burden of proof under Swain, a
defendant had to provide direct evidence of a systemic pattern of strikes
against African Americans by the specific prosecutor in his jurisdiction.78
Essentially, defendants had to “demonstrate that the peremptory
challenge system had been ‘perverted.’” 79 Thus, a defendant would fail
under Swain unless he could show that the prosecutors in his jurisdiction
had exercised their strikes to exclude blacks from the jury to
systematically and uniformly strike African Americans, almost without
exception. 80 It was not enough to show that the process had failed him;
he had to show that the process failed most minority defendants. Given
the exceptionally high showing required under Swain, this requirement
proved far too great for most defendants, and equal protection remained
elusive. 81

B.
Expansion to “All Relevant Circumstances”: Batson v.
Kentucky
In 1986, recognizing that the current legal regime had “placed on
defendants a crippling burden of proof, making prosecutors’ peremptory
challenges [ . . . ] largely immune from constitutional scrutiny,” 82 the
Court decided to increase the types of admissible evidence yet again. In
Batson v. Kentucky, the Court dismissed the cumbersome requirement of

75

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203–04 (1965) (overruled by Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
76
Id.
77
See Swain, 380 U.S. at 226.
78
Id. at 237.
79
Construction and Application of Constitutional Rule of Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986), 8 A.L.R. FED. 2D 547 (originally published in 2006).
80
Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
81
See id.
82
Batson, 476 U.S. at 92–93, 103 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[m]isuse of the
peremptory challenge to exclude black jurors has become both common and flagrant.
Black defendants rarely have been able to compile statistics showing the extent of that
practice.”).
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having to show a systemic, jurisdiction-wide pattern of discrimination as
inconsistent with the spirit of equal protection. 83
To establish a prima facie case under Batson, the defendant must
first prove that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the
prosecutor used peremptory challenges against members of the
defendant’s race. 84 “Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact,
as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate
who are of a mind to discriminate.’” 85 The defendant must then show
that these facts, along with any other relevant circumstances, raise an
inference that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to exclude venire
members based on race. 86
Most importantly with regard to statistics, Batson directed the trial
court to “consider all relevant circumstances” when examining a claim of
discrimination and discriminatory intent. 87 The Court’s examples of
relevant circumstances included the prosecutor’s pattern of strikes
against black venire members. 88 The list of relevant circumstances also
included circumstantial evidence of invidious intent and “under some
circumstances proof of discriminatory impact.”89 Admittedly, the list of
relevant circumstances did not explicitly mention the pattern of strikes in
other cases or throughout other jurisdictions. However, the Court made
clear that the list was “merely illustrative.” 90 In fact, the Court was so
careful not to limit avenues of proof that it explicitly cautioned that this
list is not exhaustive and advised that courts should give “significant
deference” to the trial judge in deciding what other factors were relevant
in making a prima facie case of discrimination. 91
The context of this opinion is helpful in understanding its breadth.
This expansion to “all relevant circumstances” was a direct reaction to
the practical difficulty in proving racial bias.92 Recognizing that
evidentiary restrictions often frustrated the goal of equal protection,

83

“[T]o dictate that ‘several must suffer discrimination’ before one could object would
be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” Id. at 95 (Marshall, J.
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 960, 965).
84
Id. at 96.
85
Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
86
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97.
87
Id. at 96. The third requirement to establish a prima facie case generates the most
controversy.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 93.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94.
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Batson directed courts to consider “the totality of relevant facts.” 93Thus,
by refusing to narrowly limit the scope of what was relevant, the Court
demonstrated a clear desire to provide a true remedy for racial
discrimination. 94
However, the application of Batson had one significant
shortcoming. 95 Under Batson, the prosecution can defeat a challenge by
providing a plausible non-racial explanation for the strike. 96 Since the
peremptory strike, by its very nature, affords the privilege to excuse
certain jury members without an articulable reason, this requirement was
often very easy to satisfy. 97 Even though the explanation has to be “clear
and reasonably specific,” there proved to be far too many acceptable nonracial reasons for excusing a juror. 98 For instance, prosecutors were
allowed to excuse jurors for vague, nondescript reasons such as poor
body language and demeanor or low intelligence. 99 Thus, a skilled
prosecutor could exercise racially motivated peremptory strikes yet still
provide a plausible, albeit fictitious, non-racial reason for each strike. 100
This difficulty created serious problems of enforcement that prosecutors
exploit to this day. 101

C.
A Setback For Statistical Evidence or A Misinterpreted
Holding?: McCleskey v. Kemp
Batson’s shortcoming has been heavily exploited. Prosecutors are
consistently able to point to a non-racial reason for strikes, making it
extremely difficult to prove discriminatory intent on a case-by-case
basis. 102 In response, defendants tried to show racial bias in other stages
93

Id. at 96.
Id. at 94.
95
Id.
96
See id. at 106.
97
See id.
98
Id. at 124.
99
See, e.g., People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (1989) (casual manner); United
States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010–11 (5th Cir. 1987) (“posture and demeanor”);
United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987) (“poor attitude”); United
States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070–71 (5th Cir. 1987) (“avoidance of eye contact”).
100
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987).
101
See, e.g., Alan Raphael, Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court
Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 293, 349 (1989)
(discussing the difficulty of proving racial bias under Batson); David D. Hopper, Note,
Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and
Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L. REV. 811, 836–38 (1988).
102
Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson,
and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 162 (2010) (“Not surprisingly,
Batson has engendered an enormous amount of often virulent criticism . . . . One even
94
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and through other means. One of the most well-known attempts, and the
one whose eventual failure is most commonly cited by opponents of
statistics, is Warren McCleskey’s push to invalidate the Georgia death
penalty because of its disparate impact against blacks. 103
In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court examined “whether a complex
statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considerations enter into
capital sentencing determinations proves that petitioner McCleskey’s
capital sentence is unconstitutional under the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment.” 104 The statistical study in McCleskey showed that the
death penalty in Georgia was imposed more often against black
defendants and killers of white victims. 105 Specifically, it “found that
prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving black
defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases involving white
defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving black
defendants and black victims; and 19% of the cases involving white
defendants and black victims.” 106 .
The McCleskey Court noted that statistics are acceptable proof of
intent to discriminate in some contexts, such as an “equal protection
violation in the selection of the jury venire in a particular district.” 107
While it found that statistics generally must show a “stark pattern to be
accepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent under the
Constitution,” the Court also noted that due to “the nature of juryselection [courts] have permitted a finding of constitutional violation
even when the statistical pattern does not approach such extremes.” 108
less charitable commentator has said, ‘Batson is either a disingenuous charade or an illconceived sinkhole.” Batson and its progeny appear to remain ineffective, despite the fact
that other members of the Court have recognized the role of implicit bias in the legal
system.).
103
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279. For a discussion of the political efforts leading up to
the enactment of the law and the evidence of discrimination, see Landmark: McCleskey
v. Kemp, NAACPLDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/case/mccleskey-v-kemp (last visited
Apr. 14, 2015).
104
Id. Notably, this case examined whether the disparate impact and imposition of the
death penalty makes the use of the death penalty unconstitutional in that state, and only
tangentially touches on the use of peremptory strikes that might lead to this end result.
For an excellent discussion of McCleskey and its political and social consequences, see
Caitlin Naidoff, Confronting the Fear of “Too Much Justice”: The Need for a Texas
Racial Justice Act, 19 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 169 (2013).
105
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 321.
106
Id. at 287.
107
Id.
108
Id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977). The Court gives several examples including Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,
495 (1977) (2-to-1 disparity between Mexican-Americans in county population and those
summoned for grand jury duty); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970) (1.6-to-1
disparity between blacks in county population and those on grand jury lists); Whitus v.
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The Court’s recognition of the myriad opportunities for subtle acts of
discrimination as well as the importance of statistics suggested that it
might respond by lowering the evidentiary burden in the jury-selection
context. But the Court took a different approach. It found that
McCleskey’s statistics, while they showed a racial disparity, did not
demand an inference of racial discrimination. 109 Rather, the Court
reasoned, the study “indicate[d] [only] a discrepancy that appears to
correlate with race,” which the Court felt was a “far cry from [a] major
systemic defect.” 110
According to the Court, a mere statistical correlation is not enough to
demonstrate bias in this context because the decision to impose the death
penalty is fundamentally different from other instances in which statistics
have been used. In other words, the ultimate decision to impose the death
penalty is based on “innumerable factors that vary according to the
characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of a particular
case” and, therefore, cannot be analyzed through statistics.111 According
to the Court, it would be nearly impossible to analyze the considerations
that go into these decisions for each jury member and the prosecutor
when deciding to impose a sentence of death because it would be
impossible to control for any single aspect of the discretionary decisionmaking process. 112
This holding was seemingly premised on two points. As a general
rule, mere correlation does not necessarily demonstrate causation.113
And, more specifically, disparities in the degree of punishment may
simply be a product of both prosecutorial as well as juror discretion,
something the Justices saw as an “inevitable114 part of our criminal
justice system.” 115 According to the Court, prosecutors and jurors have to
make complex decisions on a variety of factors when deciding the
appropriate punishment for a crime. 116 As long as our system affords
prosecutors and juries such broad discretion in criminal trials, the

Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967) (3-to-1 disparity between eligible blacks in county
and blacks on grand jury venire).
109
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286 (“defendants charged with killing blacks received the
death penalty in only 1% of the cases. The raw numbers also indicate a reverse racial
disparity according to the race of the defendant: 4% of the black defendants received the
death penalty, as opposed to 7% of the white defendants.”).
110
Id. at 312.
111
Id. at 294.
112
See id. at 294–95.
113
Id.
114
And apparently excusable.
115
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312–13.
116
Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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imposition of punishment cannot be uniform. 117 Since this discretion is
deemed such a “fundamental value of jury trial,” the Court “decline[d] to
assume that what is unexplained is invidious.” 118
In its defense of discretion and its resulting discrepancies, the Court
also pointed to procedural safeguards that make the process as fair as
possible. 119 The Court noted that chief among these safeguards is a
“properly constituted venire” to come to an impartial decision. 120 Even if
the prosecutor had racist motives for seeking the death penalty, the jury
theoretically will act as an impartial check to these biases. 121
If all of the factors the Court assumed were true the Court’s
reasoning is at least arguably plausible in the context of general
disparities in sentencing. Juries are a fundamentally important
component of our legal system and are ultimately tasked with
determining guilt or innocence. 122 Therefore, it should be very difficult
to overturn a properly constituted jury’s considered judgment. However,
applying McCleskey’s reasoning, as opponents of statistical evidence
have done, to the jury selection context is a fundamental mistake.
Unquestionably, the jury cannot serve as an effective check if it is
selected in a discriminatory fashion. When the defendant argues a Batson
challenge, he is challenging that very assumption; he claims that this jury
is not impartial. 123 Therefore, to apply McCleskey to discriminatory
strikes is to assume as true the very issue in question.
Refusing to apply McCleskey in the context of jury selection is not
an indictment of McCleskey as McCleskey was not about jury selection.
On the contrary, it was a case about disparate impact in capital
sentencing that assumed proper jury selection. 124 The statistics
undoubtedly showed that race was strongly correlated to the death
117

Id. at 297.
Id. at 313.
119
Id. at 313 (citing Singer v. United States, supra, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965)).
120
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294.
121
It is a fundamental notion of our legal system that a properly constituted jury of
one’s peers serves an invaluable check on the arbitrary exercise of government power.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The jury secures the criminal defendant’s fundamental
“protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.” Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880).
122
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
123
See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson et. al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit
Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513
(2014) (finding evidence of implicit racial bias in a juror’s perception criminal
defendant’s case); see also Patrick Bayer, et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal
Trials, DUKE POP. RESEARCH INST. (June 2011) (analyzing the effect of different racial
compositions of jury on criminal verdicts).
124
See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295 (“each particular decision to impose the death
penalty is made by a petit jury selected from a properly constituted venire”).
118
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penalty. 125 However, the defendant was challenging the decision to seek
the death penalty and, in doing so, seemingly indicting the racial
motivations of the prosecutor, judge, and jury. 126 That the Court was
noticeably hesitant to permit a statistical finding to overturn the decision
of what it assumed to be an impartial jury is in some ways not
surprising. 127 After all, to do so would challenge a fundamental tenet of
our justice system that jury decisions are not affected by racial or other
bias. 128 The study did not show, nor did it purport to show, that the jury
was improperly selected or that it was the product of racial bias.129 Based
on the question presented and the concepts at issue, the Court exercised
what it perceived as restraint and held that this specific statistical
analysis (which only showed a racial discrepancy) is, on its own,
insufficient to invalidate a death sentence.130
Another matter that bears mentioning here is the oft-repeated
contention that McCleskey leaves the decision of whether statistics can
be used to show racial discrimination to the state legislature.131
McCleskey recognized the role of states in meting out punishments for
crimes. However, the language in McCleskey regarding state legislatures
refers to the disparate impact of the death penalty in Georgia and whether
maintaining capital punishment is appropriate in light of the Eighth
Amendment. 132 The Eighth Amendment is interpreted in such a way as to
protect the “dignity of man” and is determined based on “evolving
standards of decency.” 133 Naturally, this standard makes more room for
legislative input than the Fourteenth Amendment, whose dictates are
clear. Accordingly, the Court declined to weigh in on the legislative
determination of what the precise standards of dignity are in the State of
Georgia. 134 However, the Court did not say that the admissibility of

125

See id. at 285.
Id.
127
See id. Whether this hesitation is appropriate is another matter entirely.
128
See id.
129
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296. Furthermore, as opposed to a Batson challenge, the
jurors did not have an opportunity to explain why their decision was not racially biased.
130
Id at 297.
131
NC Republicans Propose Racial Injustice Act, BLUE NC (Apr. 5, 2011),
http://www.bluenc.com/nc-republicans-propose-racial-injustice-act; see also Moving
Beyond “Racial Blindsight”? The Influence of Social Science Evidence After the North
Carolina Racial Injustice Act, MICH. ST. UNIV. COLLEGE OF LAW (2010),
http://law.msu.edu/blindsight/introduction.html.
132
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 300.
133
Id.
134
“First among these indicia are the decisions of state legislatures, ‘because the . . .
legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining’ contemporary standards.” Id. (citing
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 175 (1976)).
126
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statistics, or any other relevant evidence to prove racial discrimination,
should be determined exclusively by the states.
In fact, it could not have made such a claim. There can be no
question that states are absolutely barred from denying African
Americans the protection of an impartial jury. The Court has
continuously upheld that principle by striking down laws and limiting
practices that enforced or allowed racial discrimination as repugnant to
the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. 135 It has also held that
the imposition of unnecessary evidentiary hurdles renders the Fourteenth
Amendment ineffective. Since peremptory strikes can be used to
discriminate, a defendant must have the right to challenge them when
they are used in a discriminatory fashion. 136 Thus, states cannot limit the
use of evidence that the Court has deemed necessary in making out a
claim of discrimination.137 An alternative holding would effectively
allow states to circumvent the Fourteenth Amendment—the very
amendment designed to prevent the states from discriminating. 138

D.
Expanding Outside the “Four Corners” of the Case:
Miller-El v. Dretke
Subtle tactics of racial exclusion have always been a problem. 139 For
example, in 1948 the Clerk of Court for Bertie County, North Carolina
admitted to printing the names of black jury pool members in red and the
names of whites in black so that the prosecutor could achieve an allwhite jury without ever meeting the members. 140 Decades following
State v. Speller, racially driven exclusionary tactics had become more
advanced and increasingly difficult to prove. By 2005, the use of racial
stereotypes seemed even “better organized and more systematized than
ever before.” 141 In a bizarre twist, at least one District Attorney’s office
used a statistical “demographic analysis” to decide which races and
135

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
136
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 300 (citations omitted).
137
See e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“it is a general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or
action at law . . .”).
138
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
139
Olatunde Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness In Criminal Justice, COL. HUMAN
RIGHTS L. REV. 233 (2008); Frank Baumgartner, Detecting Bias Essential in Death
Penalty Cases, THE BURLINGTON TIMES (Nov. 26, 2011) https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/
Innocence/NC/Burlington-Times-News-RJA-Nov-26-2011.pdf.
140
State v. Speller, 47 S.E.2d 537, 538 (N.C. 1948).
141
See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005).
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genders to strike. 142 In this way, the prevailing interpretation of
McCleskey yielded an absurd result—prosecutors were using statistics to
more effectively discriminate, yet defendants could not show this
discrimination through statistical evidence of their own.
The Court attempted to address the problem of overly restrictive
evidentiary hurdles and follow Batson’s move toward “less discouraging
standards for assessing a claim of purposeful discrimination” in the
capstone case of Miller-El v. Dretke. 143 The Miller-El Court recognized:
although the move from Swain to Batson left a defendant
free to challenge the prosecution without having to cast
Swain’s wide net, the net was not entirely consigned to
history, for Batson’s individualized focus came with a
weakness of its own owing to its very emphasis on the
particular reasons a prosecutor might give . . . If any
facially neutral reason sufficed to answer a Batson
challenge, then Batson would not amount to much more
than Swain . . . Some stated reasons are false, and
although some false reasons are shown within the four
corners of a given case, sometimes a court may not be
sure unless it looks beyond the case at hand. 144
The Court relied, in part, on the “all relevant circumstances”
language in Batson to justify looking outside of the “four corners” of the
defendant’s case to find racial discrimination by the Dallas County,
Texas District Attorney’s Office.145 In an attempt to discover the true
intent of the prosecution, the Court looked past the evidence from MillerEl’s own case to patterns of racial discrimination in the prosecutorial
district. 146 In addition to statistics from Miller-El’s own trial that showed
the prosecution peremptorily struck 10 out of 14 blacks from the jury, the
Court looked to side-by-side comparisons of struck blacks and whites as
well as the District Attorney’s Office historical jury selection
practices. 147
Several components of the Court’s opinion suggest an implicit
endorsement of statistics. First, the Court examined a wide array of

142

See id. (“one jury-selection guide counsels attorneys to perform a “demographic
analysis” that assigns numerical points to characteristics such as age, occupation, and
marital status—in addition to race”).
143
Id. at 239.
144
Id. at 239–40.
145
Id. at 240.
146
See id. at 266.
147
Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241.
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“relevant circumstances” to discover discriminatory intent.148 The
evidence included the State’s long-standing practice of strategic “jury
shuffling” that sought to keep African Americans toward the back of the
venire panel. 149 Jury shuffling refers to a procedure by which one side
can change the order in which prospective jurors will be called for voir
dire examination. 150 This process, when employed at the proper time,
ensures that most African Americans would be called on later in the
selection process or potentially not at all. 151 Therefore, prosecutors could
effectively bar minorities from the jury without having to strike them. By
purposefully seeking to exclude jurors based solely on their race, this use
of jury shuffling falls squarely in the category of prohibited
discrimination.152 However, it would be difficult, if not impossible to
prove that jury shuffling in any one case was racially motivated. 153 The
sample size would be far too low, allowing a prosecutor to explain away
individual shuffles as mere exercises of discretion.154
Second, and most importantly, the Court looked to the aggregate of
cases in Dallas County to find a policy of racist strikes. 155 The Court
found that “for decades” before this trial, “the Dallas County office had
followed a specific policy of systematically excluding blacks from
juries.” 156 In support of this claim, the Court pointed to direct testimony
that prosecutors were sometimes encouraged to exclude blacks. For
148

Id at 240.
“[T]he prosecution’s decision to seek a jury shuffle when a predominant number of
African–Americans were seated in the front of the panel, along with its decision to delay
a formal objection to the defense’s shuffle until after the new racial composition was
revealed, raise a suspicion that the State sought to exclude African–Americans from the
jury. Our concerns are amplified by the fact that the state court also had before it, and
apparently ignored, testimony demonstrating that the Dallas County District Attorney’s
Office had, by its own admission, used this process to manipulate the racial composition
of the jury in the past.” Id. at 254 (citations omitted).
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Comes to Capital Punishment, FINDLAW, (June 24, 2004), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
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instance, a former assistant in the District Attorney’s office stated that
“his superior warned him that he would be fired if he permitted any
African–Americans to serve on a jury.” 157 Prosecutors were even given a
manual that justified racial exclusion from jury service. 158 Both forms of
evidence showed that the Dallas County office had, for some time,
supported racial profiling in jury selection.159
However, none of the evidence dealt with Miller-El’s case in
particular. In fact, the manual was merely “available” to only one
prosecutor in the office at the time of Miller-El’s trial. 160 There was no
evidence that the prosecutor actually used or read the manual. Indeed, the
District Attorney’s office argued that the manual was no longer in
circulation when Miller-El was arrested for the crime. 161 Under some
interpretations of McCleskey, this evidence would not be admissible to
prove racial bias in this defendant’s case as it could not be directly and
conclusively tied to the disposition of the matter before the Court. 162
Nevertheless, the Court looked beyond this issue and found adequate
evidence of racial bias. 163 This holding not only called on courts to look
past the case at hand, but it also exhorted them to strike actions that may
not have indisputable and direct evidence of bias.164 The Court admitted
that “peremptories are often the subjects of instinct, and it can sometimes
be hard to say what the reason is.” 165 “But when illegitimate grounds like
race are in issue” the courts must look beyond the “pretextual” reasons to
prevent bias. 166 In so stating, the Court reaffirmed the sentiment
previously expressed in Batson that the courts must make a meaningful
effort to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
A crucial part of this effort involves looking beyond an individual
case for indirect evidence of patterns and policies; a look that should
naturally be aided by statistics.
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THE NEXT STEP: STATISTICS

As set forth above, the historic arc of the Court’s jurisprudence
bends toward inclusion of many forms of indirect evidence, specifically
evidence outside the “four corners” of the case that can demonstrate a
“pattern” of racially biased strikes. However, the legal debate has
focused almost exclusively on one form of indirect evidence—statistics.
Advocates of statistics point out that statistical models are
immensely helpful in detecting relationships and behavioral patterns.167
They are widely used to predict and discern patterns and behavior in a
variety of fields, including oncology, sociology, and behavioral
psychology. 168 By isolating potentially relevant variables, models can
determine whether the observed patterns reflect corresponding patterns in
decision making or are merely random fluctuations that merely correlate
with the variable at issue.169 In other words, inferential statistics can help
determine whether a prosecutor’s decision to strike a black juror was
caused by the juror’s race or if the juror’s race was not a factor in the
decision.
Despite its theoretical attractiveness, statistical evidence must still
pass muster under the Federal Rules of Evidence before it is admitted.
First, statistics must have the tendency to make a relevant fact more or
less probable. 170 The relevant fact is the motive for the prosecutor’s
decision to excuse a juror: Was the purported non-racial reason the actual
reason or was it pretext for a racially biased action? With respect to this
point, there can almost be no question that statistics are relevant. The
Supreme Court has specifically endorsed the use of statistics to prove
pretext in other contexts—most notably in employment discrimination.171
In Title VII cases, plaintiffs are able to use statistical patterns in hiring,
firing, and promotion to demonstrate that an employer’s asserted reason
for its employment decisions are not the true ones. 172
For instance, in International Brotherhood. Of Teamsters v. United
States, the Court held that a plaintiff can use evidence of gross statistical
disparities to show a pattern and practice of racial discrimination. 173 In
167

FREDERICK GRAVETTER, STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 124 (2012).
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Id.
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FED. R. EVID. 401.
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Members of the Court have also looked to statistical evidence in other cases,
including in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (examining the deterrent effect of
capital punishment).
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See, e.g., Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 2005). In Obrey, the Ninth
Circuit found that a statistical report tending to show a correlation between race and
promotion constituted additional evidence of discrimination.
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that case, the plaintiff presented evidence that African American
employers were hardly ever promoted to “line driver” to show that she
was not promoted due to her race. 174 In fact, only one African American
in the entire company had been promoted to this position, while whites
were promoted at a very high rate. Finding that “statistical analyses have
served and will continue to serve an important role in which the
existence of discrimination is a disputed issue,” the Court found that this
evidence demonstrated discriminatory intent.175
Statistics involving a large number of cases have been most heavily
attacked. However, statistical evidence that incorporates a large number
of cases and actions yields more, not less, reliable data than evidence
from just one case. 176 The largest hurdle to a reliable statistical model is
variability; each interaction contains some unique circumstances and
outlying considerations that could explain the phenomena. 177 In other
words, in any one case the prosecutor may actually have a negative
feeling about a juror that has nothing to do with the juror’s race.
Therefore, his striking of that one juror may not tell us much about why
he engages in strikes.
The variability problem is controlled by increasing the number of
iterations. That is, the more prosecutor strikes that occur, the less likely
any outlying considerations, such as an individual’s personality, is to
skew the data sample. As a threshold matter, we can certainly say that
the average African American juror is as qualified to serve as any other
juror, i.e. his demeanor, intellect, and mannerisms are no more
objectionable than the average non-black juror. However, we cannot say
that each African American (or white) juror in any specific case
represents the “average” juror. Therefore, it is quite possible that one
specific juror really does have a bad demeanor and just happens to be
black. Thus, it is difficult to read much into the fact that this juror was
excluded.
However, evidence that the prosecutor consistently, over a large
number of cases, strikes black jurors at a very high rate tells a different
story. The effect of any outliers is minimized, and we are more justified
in relying on what we know about the general population of African
Americans—that they are as qualified to serve as the general white
population. Accordingly, with each additional striking of a black or white
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juror the prosecutor paints a clearer picture of his racial biases, or lack
thereof.
The statistical study employed pursuant to North Carolina’s RJA
demonstrated such a pattern of racial bias. In North Carolina v.
Robinson, the first case brought under the RJA, the Cumberland County
Superior Court considered statistical evidence of racial bias in that
prosecutorial district and county. Upon review of the evidence, Judge
Weeks endorsed the quality of the study, finding that the statistical
analysis showed “race, not reservations about the death penalty, not
connections to the criminal justice system, but race, drives prosecution
decisions about which citizens may participate in one of the most
important and visible aspects of democratic government.”178
Still, despite their ability to illuminate patterns and motivations,
statistics are usually attacked on relevance grounds. The major argument
against statistical evidence is thatit does not prove that any specific strike
was done for racial reasons. 179 This perceived problem manifests in two
major ways: at the individual level and at the regional, state, or district
level.
The problems at the individual level stem from one concern: people
do not always follow the same pattern. In other words, even though a
prosecutor has engaged in a pattern of racially biased actions, he might
not have made any racist strikes in this defendant’s case. 180 Quite simply,
the prosecutor, who normally strikes due to race and uses demeanor or
attire as his pretexts, may actually have stuck a specific juror because of
his poor demeanor or sloppy dress. Yet, under the statistical evidence
approach, a defendant would still obtain relief by proving that the
prosecutor habitually strikes African American jurors in other cases. 181
178

Order Granting Motions for Appropriate Relief at *2–3, North Carolina v. Golphin
et al., Nos. 97 CRS 47314-15, 98 CRS 34832, 35044, 01 CRS 65079, (N.C. Sup. Ct. Dec.
13, 2012).
179
See e.g., Jordan, DAs Seek Repeal of Death Penalty Law, WRAL (Nov. 15, 2011)
(quoting District Attorney Scott Thomas “[i]n its current form, generalized statewide
statistics can be used to vacate every death sentence in North Carolina. We believe that
death penalty decisions should be based upon the facts and the law of a particular case
not on generalized unreliable statewide statistics”); see also Frank Baumgartner,
Detecting bias essential in death penalty cases, THE BURLINGTON TIMES-NEWS (Nov. 26,
2011), http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/Innocence/NC/Burlington-Times-News-RJA-Nov26-2011.pdf.
180
In fact, character evidence is strictly barred to prove that a party acted in
conformance with that character trait in any given instance. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
181
Kim Severson, North Carolina Repeals Law Allowing Racial Bias Claim in Death
Penalty Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, (Jun. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/us/
racial-justice-act-repealed-in-north-carolina.html (reporting concern that “a white
supremacist who murdered an African-American could argue he was a victim of racism if
blacks were on the jury.”).
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In the second scenario, the individual prosecutor may not have any
noticeable biases. 182 However, his office engaged in a noticeable pattern
of striking African American jurors throughout the district,
demonstrating a clear racial bias.183 Under most conceptions of a racial
justice act, any defendant in which this prosecutor picked the jury would
be entitled to some form of relief on the grounds that the prosecutorial
district is corrupted. Therefore, even if a prosecutor does not engage in a
pattern of racially-motivated strikes, his actions may still be viewed in
light of the general actions of the district or even state over which he has
no control. 184
In many ways, these scenarios appear unsettling. However, these
issues do not doom the use of statistics, nor do they compromise the
legitimacy of broader statistical evidence. First, there are extraordinary
institutional benefits to vacating even these “untainted” sentences. In
both of the above-described scenarios, the justice system failed to afford
a certain number of its defendants the fundamental right to equal
protection of the laws. 185 The prosecutorial system was broken. 186 Public
trust and confidence in a racially-tainted prosecutorial mechanism would,
and should, be extraordinarily limited. Even though an individual capital
sentence may have somehow avoided the effects of racial bias, it may not
escape untainted in the public’s eye. 187
Next, the Supreme Court has already decided that, on the balance,
vacating individual sentences that are not clearly the product of racial
bias is necessary to properly effectuate the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 188 As has been mentioned above, direct proof of racial bias
182
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is extraordinarily difficult to achieve.189 Even if an individual has
suffered from racial bias, it may be impossible to prove on an individual
act level. 190 Recognizing this problem, the Court has decided that it is
prudent and just to look for indirect proof outside the four corners of the
case. 191 The fact that some cases in which race may not have been a
defining factor are called into question might be an unavoidable
necessity.
Finally, cultures of discrimination have indirect effects. A prosecutor
employed in a biased district may be more likely to strike a defendant
due to race than he would have been absent the biased culture. Thus,
regardless of the prosecutor’s intent, the harm is essentially the same: An
African American defendant is more likely to receive an unfair trial
because he is an African American. While the justifiability of statistical
evidence likely cannot hinge solely on indirect effects, the fact that racial
discrimination produces often unmeasurable negative side effects
counsels toward restraint and caution when dealing with a broken
system.

IV.

SOLUTIONS: STATUTES OR LAWSUITS?

Statistical evidence has rarely had its day in court against peremptory
strikes. The most commonly discussed tactic for solving this problem is a
political one: states could pass a racial justice act conferring the statutory
right to use statistical evidence. 192 Most advocates seeking to change the
current evidentiary regime have advocated for a change in the laws. 193
Such a statutory conferral of rights would be an ideal outcome in many
ways. 194 The right would be explicitly stated in the legislation and there
could be little contestation over whether the statutory right applies.
Moreover, as in the case with the North Carolina Racial Justice Act, a
specific law could afford individuals who have exhausted their appeals
the ability to raise a new argument. However, the political option is also
plagued by problems, some inherent to the political system itself and
some unique to capital litigation.
Political solutions—generally hard to come by—are especially
difficult in the capital punishment context. From a pragmatic perspective,
189
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political solutions are generally slow and often face challenges extrinsic
to the issue’s legal merit, such as public perception and political
allegiances. 195 Passing legislation in the death penalty context raises an
extra hurdle. Protections for individuals accused of capital crimes
necessarily protect individuals who are accused of some of the most
severe crimes.196 Like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary principle that
often operates to the advantage of the “guilty,” the obvious targeted
beneficiary of a racial justice act is someone convicted of engaging in a
capital offense. 197 Thus, elected officials, who often feel pressured to be
“tough on crime,” might be even more hesitant to advocate reform that
could vacate a death sentence. 198
Moreover, a “racial justice act” is, at its core, a humble
acknowledgement of a state’s flawed history and its failure to serve its
citizens, especially members of minority groups. 199 Without at least
implying that racial bias might have existed—or still does—in the
criminal justice system, a racial justice act would appear unnecessary.
Politicians and constituents must be willing to admit that the legal system
suffers from some of the same racial biases that have plagued the
American system since its founding. Finally, given the often-shocking
nature criminal actions that spawn capital trials, it is all too easy to lose
focus on the foundational constitutional protections and ask for some sort
of “vengeance.”
Political tides may shift and wash away any hard won-victories.
North Carolina’s experience is an excellent paradigm for the often
ephemeral nature of some political successes. In 2010, North Carolina
was able to overcome several political hurdles and pass the Racial Justice
Act. 200 Through the work of dedicated advocates, especially those at the
ACLU Capital Punishment Project and the NAACP, statistical evidence
of racial bias in Cumberland County, North Carolina was used to vacate
195
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the death sentence against Marcus Robinson and commute it to a term of
life in prison. 201 While this result garnered significant praise in many
circles, the success of statistics in proving racial bias did not sit well with
some North Carolina politicians. When the North Carolina Assembly
experienced a radical political shift, it gutted the RJA and removed its
statistical evidence provision. 202 While North Carolina was able to pull
off a remarkable achievement by marshalling the political will to pass a
law allowing the introduction of statistical evidence and using it to show
that racial bias infected the criminal justice system, its advancements
were short-lived.
Despite this result, this Article argues that the protections identified
in the RJA are not lost; a defendant may still vindicate these rights
through constitutional litigation. North Carolina’s Act codified the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on Fourteenth Amendment protections
against racially motivated peremptory strikes in three important ways.
First, the RJA prevents the imposition of any capital sentence that was
sought or obtained based on race.203 This component of the RJA flows
directly from the Court’s decisions from Strauder to Brown to the
present day that the Fourteenth Amendment “denied any State the power
to withhold from [minorities] the equal protection of the laws.”204 Since
the state clearly denies equal protection when it deliberately excludes
members of the defendant’s race from the jury, peremptory strikes must
always be race neutral. 205 This freedom from racial discrimination clearly
lives in the Fourteenth Amendment and is a fundamental component of
any fair system. 206 Thus, to challenge the category of protections
afforded by this first provision is to challenge the Fourteenth
Amendment and over 150 years of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Second, the RJA allows defendants and calls on the courts to look
beyond the four corners of the case at hand. 207 This provision permits
evidence of pattern and policy that is not directly linked to the case at
hand to be considered during trial.208 Evidence of patterns, custom, and
policy are widely used to prove knowledge and intent, yet opponents of
this practice successfully argued that courts should not be able to
consider information or actions that do not flow directly out of the case
201

Id.
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before the court. 209 However, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that courts should look beyond the defendant’s individual case to prevent
discrimination, especially discriminatory strikes. The Court in Swain
allowed for a finding of racial discrimination if the defendant could show
a systemic pattern of strikes against African Americans in the
prosecutorial district. 210 This holding necessarily required looking
beyond the case at hand and examining the prosecutor’s actions in the
aggregate. 211 In Miller-El, the Court, finding that confining the scope of
evidence to one’s own case was unduly burdensome and failed to
adequately guard against acts of discrimination, expressly endorsed
looking outside the “four corners” of a specific case.212 In fact, the Court
cast a “wide net” to find evidence of discriminatory patterns and
practices, including evidence from several years before the defendant’s
trial persuasive. 213 Even though there was no direct evidence that some
of the actions had any direct effect on the specific trial in Miller-El, the
Court found the danger of discrimination too great to uphold a capital
sentence. 214
Finally, the RJA expressly allowed a defendant to prove racial bias
through statistical evidence from his county, prosecutorial district, or
state. 215 Though this is the most controversial component of the bill, the
Court has allowed evidence of systemic discrimination to prove racial
bias since its 1965 decision in Swain. 216 Under Swain, a defendant could
prevail if he showed a systemic pattern of racially motivated strikes by
the prosecutor in one’s district.217 Batson told the courts to look at “all
relevant circumstances” and the “totality of relevant facts.”218 The Court
took pains not to limit the scope of inquiry and provided a “merely
illustrative” list of relevant considerations. It is hard to imagine that such
a widely accepted form of evidence would fall outside the parameters of
209

Kim Severson, North Carolina Repeals Law Allowing Racial Bias Claim in Death
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the “totality of relevant facts.”219 Finally, every constitutional right has a
remedy; the Court has found that indirect evidence is an essential route to
this remedy. Thus, a statistical evidence provision follows logically;
statistics are among the most effective and efficient ways to look at a
large sample of cases and actions.220
Despite the logical appeal of the constitutional rights argument set
out above, a full-blown litigation effort has yet to be waged. This
hesitancy is, in many ways, understandable. Courts have rejected several
statistic studies. However, a careful reading of these opinions reveals that
these rulings are less than damning. On the contrary, the Court has only
rejected studies that did not adequately capture the facts at issue; the
studies simply did not prove the fact that they set out to prove. For
instance, the McCleskey study was not rejected because it was a
statistical study or that it looked at cases outside the case at hand; it was
rejected because it merely showed a correlation between race and the
imposition of the death penalty. 221 Clearly, the Court was not
comfortable with overturning a jury verdict based on statistical evidence
of mere causation alone. However, inferential statistics have made
significant advancements since that time and are now better able to
isolate and control for certain variables, creating a strong causation
argument. In other words, a proper study may be able to control for
factors, such as “discretion,” which troubled the Court.
Therefore, the solution advocated by the Article is in some ways
simple: create better statistical studies. The methodology employed by
Barbara O’Brien and Catherine M. Grosso represents the type of
statistical analysis that should be used in any future litigation campaign.
The study controlled for outliers by analyzing peremptory strikes in
North Carolina capital cases from 1990 to 2010. It found that, of the 166
cases statewide that included at least one black venire member,
prosecutors struck an average of 56.0% of eligible black venire members,
compared to only 24.8% of all other eligible venire members. 222 More
importantly, it controlled for the other race-neutral reasons cited by
prosecutors, including death penalty views, criminal backgrounds,
employment, marital status, and hardship.223 From this data, the trial
court was able to undertake a meaningful examination of not only the
219
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correlation between race and strikes, but also whether it was race and not
some other reason that caused it. Additional studies should also borrow
from the methodology used in the McCleskey study. Evidence of
racially-biased strikes, coupled with racially-influenced outcomes,
creates, to borrow a term from Title VII jurisprudence, a more
“convincing mosaic” of decimation.

V.

CONCLUSION

Racial discrimination is a tragic but very real part of our past and our
present. The Racial Justice Act attempted to keep it from being part of
our future. It ensured that each person was afforded equal treatment
under the law. It ensured that punishment was more commensurate with
the crime and not affected by his race. It ensured that our criminal system
was seen as more legitimate, fair, and impartial. However, despite its
lofty goals, the RJA was not without precedent. Indeed, it embodied the
protections that live in the Fourteenth Amendment 224 and are found in
cases from Brown to Batson: Each citizen must be afforded equal
protection of the law regardless of his or her race. To this end, the Court
has required states to follow such prohibitions on racially motivated jury
selection similar to that in the RJA since Strauder in 1880. More recent
jurisprudence only confirms this statement.
The RJA’s statistical tools are not without precedent either. On the
contrary, the Court has accepted statistical analysis in Title VII and
venire-selection cases in the past. It has accepted proof of systemic
patterns of discrimination in a district. It has called on courts to look
beyond the “four corners” of a case and at the “totality of relevant facts.”
It has accepted these showings to give effect to the promise of equal
protection.
The evidentiary safeguards in the RJA followed Supreme Court
precedent and are essential to enforcing a defendant’s right to equal
protection. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that all people will
receive equal protection of the law. In order for this right to have any
significance, defendants must be able to enforce this right in court and
enforce it effectively. Essential to this enforcement is the ability to prove
violations when they occur. The Court in Miller-El has recognized that
confining the racial bias inquiry to the “four corners” of a defendant’s
case is unduly burdensome and constrains the defendant from enforcing
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this right. 225 Given the broad array of acceptable reasons for peremptory
strikes, prosecutors can often defeat a meritorious Batson challenge on a
case-by-case. Therefore, it might only be by looking at a large group of
cases that show a clear and consistent pattern of strikes against blacks
that the defendant can overcome these explanations and prove racial bias.
Since the Fourteenth Amendment is principally concerned with
preventing racial discrimination, it must give defendants this right to
look outside their own case to prove racial bias.
This jurisprudence has to include the use of statistics. If defendants
are allowed to look at evidence of pattern and practice outside of their
own case to create a presumption of racial bias, it follows that defendants
need to have an effective way of compiling, examining, and showing this
data. Statistical analysis is arguably the best way to look at large amounts
of data and come to a conclusion from that data. Furthermore, statistics
are commonly used in many other legal contexts and there is no clear
reason why jury selection in the capital punishment context should be
any different.
The Racial Justice Act was heralded, and rightly so, as a profound
step towards securing racial equality in sentencing and punishment.
However, these steps are made pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
and Supreme Court precedent and secure essential evidentiary rights for
all defendants. Any attempt by the state to frustrate the achievement of
such equality, must be seen as an unconstitutional attempt by the states to
limit the efficacy of the Fourteenth Amendment. Given the repugnant
nature of racial discrimination and the difficulty of proving it without the
help of statistics, legislatures cannot shrink the wide net that the Supreme
Court demands. 226 Accordingly, advocates should continue presenting
statistical evidence of discrimination, even after the RJA’s repeal and
McCleskey’s frustrating holding.
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